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The Ventura Citrus Labor Market

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INTRODUCTION

The Ventura County lemon industry employs a peak 2,500 of workers to harvest 22,000 acres of lemons. Ventura lemon harvest activity peaks from March through May and drops to about 700 harvesters during the October through December trough. This seasonal fluctuation in employment is typical of California agriculture, and often generates seasonal unemployment for workers and uncertainty among employers about whether workers will be available when needed.

The traditional casual labor market solved this seasonality problem by flooding the labor market with American and foreign workers so that harvesters were available when needed. The Ventura lemon industry, in contrast, demonstrates how employment stabilization can benefit both workers and employers. Stabilization is a process in which employers develop personnel policies such as seniority recall, internal promotion, and fringe benefits in order to employ fewer and better workers for longer periods. A stabilized system reduced uncertainty: Employers are assured that qualified workers will be available when needed, and seasonal workers are offered wages and working conditions sufficient to induce their return next season.

The Ventura County labor market experienced three distinct phases of stabilization and destabilization after the termination of the Bracero program in the mid-1960s. First, was destabilization — a period in the late 1960s marked by chaotic efforts to recruit workers from all over the United States which prompted grower and packing houses to turn responsibility for employment over to harvesting associations. These associations stabilized the labor market by 1970. The associations were operated by personnel managers who were able to raise individual worker earnings without increasing growers harvesting costs (Rosendale.and Mamer, 1974).

Harvesting association managers developed a small corps of Mexican-based ex-braceros who had greencards enabling them to live and work in the United States. During the 1970s, these greencard ex-braceros, who did much of the harvesting, began to settle in Ventura County and bring their families from Mexico, further stabilizing the labor market. As settled workers, they demanded better housing, higher wages, and fringe benefits. Complaints about housing, growers' refusal to provide the annual wage increase that was expected, and publicity about unions in the mid-1970s, permitted the United Farm Workers (UFW) to organize most Ventura lemon harvesters between 1976 and 1978.

However, higher wages and illegal immigration opened the door for lower cost farm labor contractors (FLCs) to enter Ventura County and compete for harvesting jobs with the newly unionized associations. Their entry broke down the stabilization that had been achieved, ushering in a period of destabilization in the 1980s (Mines and Martin, 1984).

Lower-cost FLCs expanded as the harvesting associations declined. By 1987 there were 27 FLCs harvesting Ventura lemons. The unionized harvesting associations had completely disappeared. The watershed event was a four month strike at the largest association in 1982; FLCs using illegal alien workers demonstrated that they could compete with the associations that had nurtured stable workforces. The labor market stability that had been achieved during the 1970s eroded as worker hiring shifted from the six associations (all with comparable wages, fringe benefits, and personnel policies) to labor contractors who paid lower wages and offered less certainty of employment. Because settled legal workers generally refuse to accept employment on FLC terms, new harvest workers were mostly illegal aliens.

The stabilization in the 1970s and subsequent fragmentation of the Ventura labor market are chronicled in two case studies examined in this report: (1) Limoneria and the Coastal Growers Association (stabilization in the 1970s) and (2) SAMCO, a large FLC which is working toward restabilization in the 1980s. Before taking a detailed look at these case studies, we present a brief overview of the U.S. lemon industry, look more closely at citrus harvesting in Ventura County, and review the history of the labor market there as it has evolved.

BACKGROUND

Citrus fruit is grown on about 1 million acres of U.S. cropland, an acreage equivalent to that of all fresh vegetables. The farm value of citrus fruit in 1982-83 was $1.8 billion, with oranges accounting for 77 percent, grapefruit 10 percent, lemons 6 percent, and limes, tangerines, tangelos, and temples 7 percent (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1984).

The United States and Italy each produce about one-fourth of the world's lemons (the United States, Italy, and Spain produce two-thirds). U.S. lemon acreage is concentrated in California and Arizona. This California-Arizona acreage is divided into three districts:

- District 1 in the Central Valley has been expanding and accounts for about 10 percent of the California-Arizona lemon production.
- District 2 in Southern California has been contracting but still accounts for 60 percent of production.
- District 3 in the California-Arizona desert has been expanding and accounts for 30 percent of production.

Districts 1 and 3 harvest lemons during the winter months, when fresh lemon prices tend to be lowest. Ventura County growers in District 2 harvest lemons year-round, but production peaks in the March through May period.[1]

Lemons are sold fresh or processed into lemon juice, soft drinks, and other

1. These differing marketing periods mean that returns to growers vary by region, with Southern California growers sometimes netting three times more per acre than other lemon growers. A potential stabilizer of lemon prices and thus returns to growers regardless of their district and time of harvesting is a shrink-wrap technology which encloses each lemon in a plastic film to prevent its dehydration without refrigeration for up to six months. Shrink-wrap makes harvested and wrapped lemons "nonperishable" at a relatively low cost.

products. Americans consume an average of 24 pounds of citrus each year, including 2 pounds of lemons. In recent years, Lemon Administrative Committee records indicate that about 25 percent of U.S. lemons have been sold fresh to American and Canadian consumers, 15 percent have been exported, and 60 percent have been processed.

Lemons are picked into bins which hold 17 or 18 field boxes. Each field box yields about 1.3 cartons (38 pounds) of packed lemons, and an acre of lemons yields about 27 to 36 bins or 600 to 800 cartons of lemons. Grower prices vary with lemon usage: In 1981-82, fresh lemons sold domestically were worth $9.19 per carton; lemons that were exported were worth $8.40; and lemons used for processing brought only $.40 per carton. Growers receive an average price weighted by these various uses for their lemons; this average price was $3.80 per carton in 1981-82. Note that *direct* (picker) harvesting costs per carton average $.69 and that total harvesting cost (including administration and fringe benefits) average $.92 to $1.15 ($.90 directs costs per 1.3 carton field box and $1.20 to $1.50 total costs), so that picking costs exceed grower returns on lemons diverted to processing.

Since 1941, Federal Marketing Order 910 has permitted lemon growers and handlers to regulate or "prorate" the weekly flow of fresh lemons to the U.S. and Canadian markets.[2] In recent years, the Lemon Administrative Committee has determined that the North American fresh market can absorb less than 30 percent of the crop. Producers and packers are free to export an unlimited quantity of lemons, but competition abroad from Italy, Spain, Argentina, and Turkey has limited U.S. exports to about 15 percent of total production. The lemon marketing order uses processing as a residual outlet for lemons diverted from the fresh domestic and export markets.

Lemon producers in Florida and Texas are not covered by Marketing Order 910, so acreage in these states is expanding because these producers do not have to divert over half of their lemons to the money-losing processing market. In addition, imports of lemons surged in the early 1980s as exports sagged, even though fresh lemon exports still exceed imports by a wide margin.

The number of California-Arizona lemon farms decreased from 6,728 in 1959 to 1,974 in 1982. Total lemon acreage rose from 62,614 to 70,014 and the average acreage per farm more than tripled from 10 to 35 acres.

Census of Agriculture data indicate that most of the structural changes in the lemon industry occurred between 1959 and 1969, (a period when census definitions and enumeration methods were relatively comparable). Lemon farms and average acreage in District 2 have been quite stable since the late 1960s: In 1969 1,200 farms included 33,200 acres; in 1983, 1,200 farms covered 34,000 acres.

There is relatively little published information on who owns these lemon farms; however, the president of Sunkist, the cooperative which coordinates the marketing of most U.S. lemons, did not dispute an

2. This information on the lemon marketing order is from Kinney, Carman, Green, and O'Connell (1987).

assertion that 80 to 90 percent of the California-Arizona citrus acreage is owned by corporate or absentee owners.[3]

In District 2 (which includes Ventura County) lemon farmers appear to fall into three groups:

- Corporate farmers, many with land that will eventually be converted to nonfarm uses (10 to 15 percent).
- Absentee, nonfarm investors awaiting increases in land prices (20 to 30 percent).
- Traditional lemon farmers who often "have been growing lemons for generations" (50 to 60 percent).

San Joaquin lemon groves were valued at $6,400 per acre in 1982, but most Ventura orchards are valued at $10,000 per acre or more, reflecting, in part, their potential nonfarm uses.

THE HARVEST LABOR MARKET

Lemons grow on thorny trees that are 8 to 16 feet high. Harvesters wearing heavy gloves, padded sleeves, and helmets work from the ground and from tripod ladders to clip each fruit with a curved scissors, drop it into a picking bag, and then dump the full bag into a field bin. Harvesters are organized into crews of 20 to 40 workers, and each crew includes a foreman and/or checker to supervise quality control and to record each worker's production.

Harvesters are paid piecerate wages. In most areas, these piecerates are determined in an ad hoc fashion: A foreman examines the height of the trees, the probable yield and size of the fruit, and orchard conditions, and announces a piecerate for picking. If the announced piecerate is too low, workers refuse to pick or do not appear the next day. Most orchards are picked two or three times a year.

In Ventura County, harvesting piecerates are sometimes established more objectively because packing houses developed rate sheets which graded each grove on three objective indicators: average tree height, yield, and fruit size. The rate sheet reduced the subjectivity and continuous bargaining inherent in the ad hoc wage determination system and helped to stabilize worker earnings under variable harvesting conditions.

The citrus industry epitomizes "agricultural management by professionals." The landowner or grower often employs a farm manager or contracts with a management firm to supervise day-to-day operations. The grower/manager selects a packing house to pack and market the fruit. The packing house receives a pro-rate market allocation from the Lemon Administrative Committee, announces the volume of harvested fruit that it can pack, employs field supervisors to allocate this volume among FLCs and other harvesting businesses, and then administers the marketing order by determining what share of each grower's fruit goes to the fresh, export, and processing markets. Most packinghouses handle accounting for the grower, deducting, for example, the cost of harvesting lemons,

3. *California Farmer*, 1985.

and issuing checks to growers for the net returns from their lemons.

Packinghouses are the central organizing institutions in the professionally-managed lemon industry. In the past, packing houses determined harvesting wages and hired workers directly. During the 1950s and 1960s, most packinghouses turned the recruitment and supervision of harvesting workers over to "independent" associations to avoid "labor troubles."

Packinghouses retain a central role in the harvest labor market, but it is an indirect role. All packing houses decide how much fruit they can accept on a daily or weekly basis, and their field supervisors transmit this quota to harvesting entities. There are three main types of harvesting entities:

- Growers who employ harvest crews directly.
- Farm labor contractors (FLCs) who make harvesting agreements directly with growers (and occasionally packinghouses), and who sometimes supply equipment to transport bins of lemons to packinghouses.
- Custom harvesters who recruit workers, supply harvesting equipment, and coordinate picking schedules with packinghouses (not with growers).

The distinction between FLCs and custom harvesters is often blurred in practice.[4]

The harvesting entity decides exactly where to pick to satisfy the packinghouse quota. A packinghouse associated with two FLC/custom harvesters may, for example, establish a daily quota of 1,000 bins for each FLC, and then each FLC reviews its list of growers associated with this packinghouse to determine exactly where to pick on a particular day.

Growers and managers first select a packinghouse on the basis of net returns and other factors, and then select a harvesting entity from the list of FLCs that are associated with each packinghouse. Thus, the key persons for most FLCs are the packinghouse managers and field supervisors who decide which FLCs are associated with a particular packinghouse and who "advise" growers and mangers who want to switch FLCs. Since lemons can be stored on the tree for several weeks, timeliness is a less important criterion for selecting a harvesting entity than "quality." Quality is a much discussed but ambiguous term which means that the fruit picked is of sufficient size and without debris and the orchard was left in a clean condition. The quality criterion leaves open the possibility for FLCs to attempt to influence supervisors to

4. Since FLCs cannot be employers under the Agricultural Labor and Relations Act (ALRA), the employer for bargaining purposes when an FLC is the harvesting entity must be either the grower or packinghouse. Unions have so far been unable to organize FLC harvest workers, so the ALRB has not yet been asked to clarify the issue of who is an FLC and who is a custom harvester in Ventura citrus.

The ALRB has has ruled that most of the harvesting associations such as Coastal Growers Association (CGA) — which registered as FLCs under the 1982 Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act — are custom harvesters because they supply equipment and decide where and how to harvest without direct grower involvement. (Growers create and act as the boards of directors of harvesting associations.) In practice, most growers and packinghouses inspect the harvest, but the growers and packinghouses cannot hire and fire association workers. The following case studies illustrate these differences.

have themselves recommended to particular growers. The relationships among the packing house, the grower-manager, the field supervisors and various types of harvesting entities are diagrammed in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The Ventura Lemon Labor Market.



*Growers select packinghouses on the basis of net returns and other factors.
**Most of the actual scheduling of harvest workers is coordinated by packinghouse field supervisors, who tell harvesting entities how much fruit to deliver each day, and the labor contractor or custom harvester who decides exactly which grove to pick.
***Each packinghouse is associated with one or more labor contractor and/or custom harvestor, and the field supervisor is the key ally for a new FLC who wants to obtain harvesting contracts. A few supervisors are involved with particular FLCs.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CITRUS LABOR MARKET OF VENTURA COUNTY, 1920-1987

The Ventura lemon industry has experienced cycles of labor surplus and shortage. Mexican workers began to dominate the work force after World War I, and employer adjustments to labor shortages and surpluses usually involved changes in living and working conditions. For example, during the 1920s, temporary labor shortages encouraged packing houses to renovate labor camps and add running water, cooking facilities, and electric lights. These improvements encouraged some workers to bring their families to Ventura County in the 1930s, stabilizing the harvest work force but also engendering demands for more living and working condition improvements, such as housing for families (Mines and Anzaldua, 1982).

A prolonged strike in 1941 encouraged the 22 Ventura area packing houses to form a "Committee of 22," which coordinated the transition from settled Mexican workers to Bracero workers. In 1947, the Committee was renamed the

Ventura County Citrus Growers Committee (VCCGC) and became the primary contractor of Braceros in the county. VCCGC recruited Braceros, assigned them to packinghouses, and reallocated them as harvesting schedules required. Packinghouses converted their worker housing to accommodate single Mexican braceros, and hired foremen directly to supervise harvest crews. VCCGC developed a master contract for citrus harvesters and established the countywide rate sheet which made piecerates vary with measurable harvesting characteristics.

The Bracero program precluded labor shortages throughout the 1950s. The piecerate schedule remained unchanged during the 1950s.[5] By 1960, however, the Department of Labor (DOL) enforced the regulation that all Bracero workers must earn the stipulated minimum hourly wage. Packinghouses, reluctant to change the countywide rate sheet, instead increased worker earning per hour by picking orchards less frequently and permitting workers to pick smaller fruit and fruit off the ground. This kept costs constant and satisfied DOL requirements.

There was also pressure from unions. The Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AFL-CIO) tried to disrupt harvesting by declaring strikes at particular orchards, thereby preventing Braceros from working in those orchards.

The packinghouses responded to DOL and union pressures in the 1960s by forming or joining harvesting associations. By 1965, almost all the packinghouses were associated with one of the six associations (Coastal Growers Association (CGA), Buena Foothill Growers, F&P Growers, L&O Growers, S&F Growers, and SP Growers). These associations, originally established to serve as a buffer between the packinghouses and both DOL and union pressures, soon assumed primary responsibility for recruiting and supervising harvest workers.

5. This section is based on Mines and Martin (1984).

Chaos and Reform: 1965-1970

The termination of the Bracero program in 1964 led to labor market chaos. Harvesting associations recruited day-haul workers from Los Angeles and migrants from the Native American and Black populations of the southwest and southeast. Although thousands of harvest workers were recruited, few stayed long in the harvest labor force. According to one estimate, 24,000 workers were employed sometime in 1965 to fill a peak of 3,000 harvesting jobs. GCA, for example, employed 8,517 harvesters in 1965 who averaged just 17 days of work each.

After the 1965 labor market chaos, the harvesting associations gained more independence from packinghouses and began to establish personnel policies that would develop a local and professional harvest work force. CGA, for example, expanded in 1966 to serve seven packinghouses by changing its wage and fringe benefits package to attract fewer but better workers. CGA guaranteed all harvesters the minimum wage ($1.30 hourly in 1966) and expanded its list of fringe benefits from eight to 28, including the addition of paid vacations, free work equipment, and a savings and retirement program.

Association attempts to develop a professional harvest work force were aided by VCCGC recruitment efforts in the Mexican Bracero sending areas. Newspaper and radio ads and recruitment visits to the Mexican states of Michoacan, Jalisco, and Guanjuato offered jobs to qualified harvest workers; Bracero harvesters willing to return to Ventura received letters offering them jobs. Until 1968, a Mexican worker could obtain Permanent Resident Aliens status — a greencard — with a letter from a U.S. employer asserting that the Mexican worker had a U.S. job.

Piecerates were increased during the 1965-66 period of chaos to attract workers, and the development of a professional harvest work force led to rising hourly earnings. At CGA, for example, average hourly earnings rose 45 percent, from $1.77 in 1965 to $2.57 in 1970. Most associations provided subsidized housing, and fringe benefits such as free transportation and picking equipment, off-the-job health insurance, and paid vacations, soon spread throughout Ventura County.

The surprise feature of this story of fewer harvest workers, rising hourly earnings, and expanding fringe benefits is that growers' harvesting costs remained stable: Direct labor costs were $0.53 per box in 1965 and $0.54 in 1970, and total costs (including fringe benefits) remained stable at $.61 per box. Average worker productivity at CGA increased 41 percent from 3.4 boxes of lemons per hour in 1965 to 4.8 by 1970.

Worker Settlement and Unionization; 1970-1980

During the early 1970s the lemon harvest labor market offered relatively good jobs to a fairly stable work force. Many harvest workers continued to commute from their Mexican homes to Ventura County for four to eight months each year, and their average annual days of work lengthened and yearly earnings rose. By the mid-1970s, these legal ex-Bracero workers were beginning to bring their families from Mexico and settle in Ventura County, setting the stage for another 1940s-style confrontation with employers over demands for more labor market improvements.

The United Farm Workers (UFW) tried to organize Ventura workers without success in the early 1970s, i.e., organizers came into the area, but no elections were held or contracts signed. The UFW's failure can be explained by the high wages and generous fringe benefit package in Ventura County, the fact that most workers still commuted from their Mexican homes each season, and the UFW's concentration of efforts in other areas in the early 1970s.

In the mid-1970s, the UFW took steps which would eventually unionize most of the associations. In 1974, the ranch committee at SP Growers called a strike over supervision and wages that was soon broken by a new personnel manager who hired replacement workers.[6] In 1975, the year the ALRA was enacted, the UFW began organizing workers

6. The strikers also demanded that their wives be allowed to work with them, that several "field bosses" be replaced, and that relatives of foremen not be allowed to work in their harvest crews (personal interview with Ralph DeLeon, April 1987).

dissatisfied with the housing at S & F Growers, and an election was held in 1977 after a strike.

The year 1978 was the high water mark for the UFW in Ventura citrus. Successive bumper crops had reduced lemon prices, and piecerate wages were not increased for the first time in several years. Many growers demanded that workers pick more carefully, and stable piecerates combined with the mandated slower and more careful picking prevented the annual increase in earnings to which pickers had become accustomed. More and more workers were settling in Ventura with their families, so when a dispute at CGA between a foreman and a harvesting crew on March 27, 1978, generated a strike by 30 harvesters, the UFW was ready to act. The strikers blocked CGA gates, causing CGA to stop harvesting, and the UFW won the March 31, 1978, election by a vote 897 to 42 (Mamer and Rosendale, 1980).

CGA was the largest and most visible association, harvesting about 30 percent of Ventura lemons. Other union victories quickly followed: Several contracts were signed in May 1978. Most contracts were similar to the CGA-UFW agreement, which was a three-year standard UFW contract that increased piecerates by 12 percent in May 1978, 5 percent in May 1979, and 5 percent in May 1980.

The UFW won the right to represent farmworkers at several associations in 1978, but the combination of (1) rising union wages and fringe benefits costs and (2) the reintroduction of lower-cost farm labor contractors (FLCs) made the union foothold unstable. By 1985, there were no active union contracts in Ventura Citrus. The chronicle of the rise and fall of union activities in the Ventura lemon industry illustrates the upper limits of stable labor markets when an ample supply of lower-wage harvest workers is available.[7]

DESTABILIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION, 1981-86

When the CGA-UFW contract expired in May 1981, negotiations had not produced a new contract and the expired contract was extended on a day-to-day basis through the fall and winter. Negotiations began in earnest in the spring of 1982, and the UFW on March 6, 1982, rejected CGA's wage offer of a 9+7+7 percent piecerate increase for a three year contract and called a strike. The strike lasted four months, but most CGA grower members readily located both local and out-of-area FLCs to harvest their lemons.

The 1982 CGA strike proved to be a watershed event in the Ventura labor market. The UFW stopped the largest association from harvesting lemons during the peak harvest

7. The longest UFW Ventura citrus battle was on the 4,300 acre Sespe Ranch. Rivcom, a California corporation, bought the ranch in 1978 just after the workers had voted to be represented by the UFW. Rivcom fired 200 workers and evicted another 500 workers from two labor camps. The 200 fired workers protested and the ALRB supported their refusal to leave Sespe housing until it considered their charges that Rivcom had fired them illegally. The workers occupied the housing until 1988, when Rivcom sold the ranch to an investment partnership and offered $250 to $500 "bribes" to encourage residents to leave. See *L.A. Times*, February 4, 1988, Part X, p. 1.

period, but growers and packinghouses experienced little difficulty getting lemons harvested. The 1982 strike taught growers that the associations were expendable because FLCs had emerged as an effective nonunion harvesting alternative.

On July 8, 1982, the UFW and CGA signed a three-year agreement (scheduled to expire on May 15, 1985) that provided for a 9 percent piecerate wage increase in 1982 (most of the 1982 lemons had already been picked by FLCs) and another 8 percent increase on May 15, 1983. Negotiations over wages only began in May 1984, but had not been concluded when CGA workers petitioned the ALRB for a decertification election in March 1985. The UFW was decertified in March 1985, and the CGA was dissolved by its grower-members on October 31, 1985, when it shrunk to one-third of its former size.

The other associations had similar experience. The rise and fall of unionized harvesting associations is mirrored in the labor market dynamics of the largest lemon grower which hires workers directly, the Limoneira Company. Limoneira is almost 100 years old, and by 1985 its 1,000 acres of lemons were 3 percent of the lemons in Southern California. Limoneira is a paternalistic employer with a history of innovative personnel practices: During the 1920s, it provided exemplary housing and became one of the first farm employers to offer fringe benefits such as paid holiday and medical insurance. However, despite the 1920s company goal of making harvest work as attractive as nonfarm work, Limoneira became as dependent on Bracero workers as the rest of the lemon industry.

Limoneira harvested and packed its own lemons and occasionally harvested the lemons of growers whose fruit was packed at the company packinghouse. In many respects, Limoneira faced less severe cost pressures than other growers: Its land was purchased in 1893, and the family owners were not as anxious to develop it for urban use as were growers with less equity.

Limoneira has employed a peak 300 harvest workers for several decades. During the late 1960s, the company added fringe benefits to attract ex-Braceros who became greencard workers. For example, it offered unemployment insurance in 1965, 13 years before it was required. In the 1970s, the list of fringe benefits expanded and more harvest workers settled in Ventura. In 1978, the UFW won an election to represent Limoneira farmworkers, and in the early 1980s growers for the Limoneira packinghouse began to switch from unionized Limoneira harvest crews to nonunion labor contractors. In 1985, Limoneira workers voted to decertify the UFW; subsequently, the ALRB ruled that Limoneira had unfairly interfered in the decertification vote and ordered Limoneira to bargain with the UFW. Interim wage increases have made workers hired directly by Limoneira the highest paid lemon harvesters in Ventura County. However, Limoneira has reduced its harvesting costs by utilizing FLCs to harvest some of its acreage.

Limoneira differs from the harvesting associations in that it is still operating. It improved its wage and benefit package in 1986 when FLCs were eroding the similar packages that had been offered to other harvest workers by the associations. As the preferred Ventura lemon employer in 1987, Limoneira was able to screen workers for legal status and still generate a lengthy list of applicants.

Despite Limoneira's wage and fringe benefit package, the company has not been able (1) to reduce worker turnover or (2) to persuade the U.S.-educated children of current harvest workers to become harvesters. Limoneira does not fire older workers as there picking speed drops and their medical and pension costs rise, as many FLCs do, but half of the harvest workers quit before they have five years seniority with the company.

The children of workers who do make a harvesting a career rarely become harvest workers themselves. Limoneira actually discourages these children from becoming farmworkers by refusing to employ family units in the harvest and by offering scholarships.

The Limoneira experience suggests that it is very difficult to make citrus harvesting a desirable career for U.S. -born or educated workers who have nonfarm job options. Even at Limoneira, which has construction-style high wages for seasonal work, extensive fringe benefits, and maximum unemployment insurance during the lull season, most replacement harvest workers are born in Mexico. The waiting list of applicants at Limoneira suggests that the best farm employers can hire legal workers, even if workers do not make harvesting lifetime careers.

CASE STUDIES

The Ventura citrus labor market provides an unusually well-documented example of farm labor dynamics. The essential elements of the story include labor shortages and housing improvements for the settled Mexican workers of the 1920s; labor unrest in the 1940s; reliance on Bracero workers from 1942 until 1965; labor market chaos and the 1965 to 1970 reforms which encouraged legal greencard workers to return to Ventura each year; worker settlement and unionization from 1970 to 1980; and labor market destabilization and fragmentation after 1980 as employment shifted from unionized harvesting associations to labor contractors and the proportion of illegal alien workers rose sharply.

The Ventura citrus labor market was stabilized in the 1970s, meaning that fewer harvest workers were employed longer by the same employer and that the average age of the work force on most farms increased. The best workers benefited by working longer at higher wages, thus substantially increasing their annual earnings. Employers benefited by not having to recruit and train a new harvest work force annually and by promoting workers already familiar with the company. The story of stabilization is examined more closely in a case study of Limoneira and the Coastal Growers Association (CGA).

Case Study One: Limoneira and the Coastal Growers Association[8]

Limoneira and CGA pursued similar personnel strategies. Both set wages near the midpoint for the area and distinguished themselves as employers by offering extra fringe benefits. Both got what they wanted: work forces that returned annually or settled in the area. Both became exemplary agricultural employers; however, jobs offered by both organizations were never seen as attractive enough to hold workers who had nonfarm alternatives. The children of settled workers, educated in the United States, tended to reject jobs as seasonal harvest workers, forcing Limoneira and CGA to turn to Mexican-born immigrants whenever replacement workers were needed.

These generous personnel policies may have succeeded in linking the farm and nonfarm labor markets for some workers, e.g., foremen. Most foremen earn $12,000 to $20,000 annually, and many farm employers offer them extra fringe benefits. Most foremen are born in Mexico, so their rural backgrounds and language barriers are obstacles to nonfarm employment. Ambitious foremen may become independent FLCs rather than seeking a nonfarm job, especially because for many foremen, the choice is between a supervisory position in agriculture and a nonsupervisory position in the nonfarm labor market, e.g., the choice might be being a foreman in lemon harvesting or a construction laborer.

Longer Term Effects

Perhaps the central paradox of the Limoneira and CGA personnel strategies was that their success in stabilizing the work force doomed it to long-run failure because of illegal immigration. Stabilization and settlement meant that the harvest work forces "aged," eventually eroding productivity and increasing fringe benefit costs. Worker expectations continued to increase, but the settled worker families did not generate a replacement work force of younger and higher productivity workers because farmworker children rejected harvesting jobs. The availability of lower-cost immigrant workers and contractors to organize them into harvest crews meant that the cost wedge between settled workers and recent arrivals eventually widened intolerably. Stability was eroded as growers selectively switched to FLCs in the late 1970s, and then switched almost entirely in the mid-1980s. Illegal immigration expedited the demise of the associations by making it easier for contractors to underbid the established associations and their legal and unionized work forces.

Ventura labor market dynamics show that work force stabilization can initially increase worker productivity and the hourly and annual earnings of harvest workers without substantially increasing grower harvesting costs. However, harvest jobs are entry-level jobs for foreign-born workers that can be made more attractive but cannot be improved enough to persuade workers to

8. For details on CGA fringe benefit costs, employment and output; wages and earnings, and vacations, see Appendix Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4, respectively. For data on Limoneira, see Appendix Table B.1.

remain in agriculture if they can obtain nonfarm jobs (foremen may be an exception). Finally, farm labor markets can change quickly. In the five years between 1965 and 1970, the harvest work force was stabilized, while the five years from 1981 to 1986 witnessed the demise of a legal and unionized workforce and their replacement by FLCs and illegal alien workers.

Case Study Two: SAMCO[9]

Servicios Agricolas Mexicanos, Inc., or SAMCO is an FLC that harvests lemons, oranges, and avocados. SAMCO is based in Santa Paula, and has been directed since its formation by Mexican-born Ralph DeLeon. DeLeon was employed by CGA from 1962 through 1973, where he was responsible for record keeping and helping to develop and administer personnel policies. In 1974, there was a strike at the SP lemon and orange harvesting association. DeLeon broke the strike by hiring replacement workers and improving communications with harvesters, thus establishing a reputation among growers for effective and nonunion personnel management. DeLeon became the personnel manager of SP growers.

SP growers lost harvesting work when a packinghouse deleted the association from its list of approved harvesting entities and SP was plagued by lawsuits, so in 1976 DeLeon persuaded two packinghouses to form a new harvesting association, Inland Growers. Inland Growers soon convinced several packinghouse managers to encourage their growers to shift to Inland, and most did.

Inland Growers was less than one year old in 1977 when DeLeon began a voluntary savings program for harvesters. The intent was to encourage worker ownership and participation in the harvesting association, both to benefit the harvest workers and to forestall unionization. The goal was to be a paternalistic employer so that the primary loyalty of workers was to the association.

Housing for harvesting became a serious problem in Ventura County as ex-braceros settled with their families. The cost and condition of housing became major issues with other citrus employers and in labor disputes: For example, at Rancho Sespe, the employer turned off utilities in an effort to (illegally) evict striking workers. Knowing that family housing had helped to make Limoneira a preferred employer, DeLeon planned to provide housing to attract workers and maintain their loyalty.

DeLeon established the Las Piedras Employee Association for Inland's harvest workers as a nonprofit entity to pool workers' savings and invest them in local housing and property. The association purchased property in 1976 and housing in 1977 with the original intention of having the workers own the property. However, worker-members were suspicious of DeLeon's motives, so Las Piedras became a for-profit corporation. Las Piedras issued stock and financed its purchases with the returns from the ranches,

9. For data on SAMCO employment and wages, see Appendix Table C.1.

rents from the houses, and employee savings.

SAMCO, a FLC organization, was established by DeLeon to replace Inland Growers in July 1977 after SAMCO purchased Inland Growers harvesting equipment. The Las Piedras housing and property company was intimately linked to SAMCO, for Las Piedras shareholders were required to be employees of SAMCO, and some SAMCO employees accumulated stock in Las Piedras through a payroll savings program. Today, over 70 employees own houses initially acquired through Las Piedras.

SAMCO began operations with the 350 workers who had been employed by Inland Growers, but rapidly expanded. Total employment almost doubled from 857 in 1978-79 to 1,636 in 1980-81, increasing again to 2,518 in 1981-82. SAMCO harvests mostly lemons and oranges (86 percent of worker earnings were in these crops in 1981-82); some grapefruit and avocados are also harvested.

One reason SAMCO grew so rapidly was that many Ventura growers believed that SAMCO workers could not be organized by the UFW[10] and SAMCO was a preferred employer for some workers because it offered association-like wages and benefits. SAMCO began operations with a rate sheet similar to the countywide rate sheet. It extended the employment period for workers willing to travel to the San Joaquin Valley and to the desert areas. But, average hourly earnings of SAMCO lemon harvesters rose only slightly from $5.19 to $5.63 between 1978-79 and 1981-82. Over 57 percent of SAMCO workers earned less than $999, while 77 percent earned less than $3,000 in 1981-82.

SAMCO's practice of extending employment by taking harvest crews out of the area proved to be counterproductive and was discontinued in 1980. Moving crews and equipment was expensive, and SAMCO crews, even though they included primarily professional harvesters,were accustomed to relatively high Ventura-level wages and benefits that growers outside Ventura were unwilling to pay. Also, several SAMCO foremen were exposed to the San Joaquin labor contracting system, and decided to quit SAMCO to become FLCs. These new SAMCO competitors offered few fringe benefits to new migrant workers who were often illegal aliens and had a ready market among growers who were withdrawing from the unionized harvesting associations. According to one estimate, 30 of Ventura's peak 103 harvesting crews switched from associations to FLCs between 1977 and 1980.

SAMCO is today the highest cost labor contractor in Ventura lemons. FLCs compete with each other for harvesting "market shares" on the basis of the overhead they charge growers. Besides the direct costs for harvesting a box of lemons—picker, foremen,

10. The UFW charged in 1978 and 1979 that the grower members of harvesting associations such as CGA were joint parties to the UFW-CGA agreement, even though CGA members never formally ratified the agreement. If the ALRLB agreed with the UFW, then grower-members might have been liable to penalties if they switched to a nonunion FLC such as SAMCO. Some grower-members of associations, however, were convinced that withdrawal was lawful and turned to SAMCO after CGA was unionized in 1978. In 1982, the ALRB ruled that grower-members can withdraw from associations by a 2-1 vote in 1982.

and checker wages— growers pay overhead to cover (1) mandatory benefits such as social security, unemployment insurance, workers compensation, and work equipment; (2) voluntary benefits such as off-the-job health insurance, pensions, and paid holidays and bonuses; and (3) administrative expenses and profits. These overhead charges are surveyed annually, allowing comparison and fostering competition.[11]

The competition among FLCs, which reduces overhead charges to growers, has prompted a considerable amount of "cheating." There are a number of mechanisms by which FLCs can manipulate employment to their advantage. Some involve job applicants, including workers who pay to be hired and workers who ask the employer to hire a friend or relative as a "trailer employee." (A trailer employee's pickings are reported under the same social security number so that there is only "one" very productive worker on the employer's payroll.) Some FLCs charge the grower or packinghouse one price (say $14) and pay the workers another (say $13.50). These mechanisms to increase FLC profits are supplemented by more traditional ones, e.g., paying workers cash to avoid payroll taxes, deducting payroll taxes from worker earnings and keeping them, or recommending certain housing or meal arrangements in exchange for a fee.

FLC cheating appears to be most prevalent among the newer ones who are still struggling for market share. Traditionally, an FLC was thought to "live well" with a profit margin of 10 percent and three crews of 30 each.[12]

SAMCO Personnel Practices

Although SAMCO is officially an FLC, it operates as did the harvesting associations. SAMCO maintains a seniority list of employees based on the identification numbers which are assigned when workers are first employed by SAMCO. Recruitment begins in December and January for the March through May lemon harvesting peak, and recall letters are sent by the Employment Service office to all SAMCO workers drawing unemployment insurance benefits as well as directly to all seniority list workers. In addition, the network or "amigo" system spreads the recall notice to friends and relatives.

11. To the direct costs of a $1 box of lemons, SAMCO charges 45 percent overhead, or 45 cents per box, for mandatory and voluntary fringe benefits and administration and profits. The average FLC overhead in Ventura is 38-39 percent, and the reported low is 36 percent. Such low overhead charges would apparently leave little or no contractor profits, since mandatory benefits include social security (7.2 percent), unemployment insurance (5.4 percent), workers compensation (7 to 16 percent) and work equipment (1 percent), for a total of 21 to 30 percent. FLC's paying the highest workers' compensation charges (frequently necessary because of falls from ladders) can offer few or no voluntary fringe benefits if they want to remain competitive and still make a profit. For example, the UFW Robert F. Kennedy family health insurance plan costs 60 to 70 cents per hour worked, which adds up to 10 cents or 10 percent per box (at 7 boxes per hour). A 30 percent mandatory overhead plus 10 percent for family health insurance means that overhead costs are 40 percent before the FLC covers administrative expenses or enjoys any profit.

12. In exchange for the start-up costs of ladders, a trailer to haul them, and worker picking bags, clippers, and sleeves, an FLC whose 90 workers average $5 hourly for 20-40 hour weeks annually will have a gross payroll of $450 x 40 x 20 = $360,000, so a 10 percent profit yields $36,000 annually (based on personal interviews with Ventura FLC's in May 1986).

SAMCO conducts all hiring at a central location. Supervisors with responsibility for four to seven crews plan harvesting schedules in conjunction with growers and packing houses and notify a dispatcher in the central office when additional workers will be needed. The dispatcher then contacts workers with the highest identification numbers or contacts those whose employment applications are on file.

All workers claiming to be qualified harvesters can be hired. Hiring involves the assignment of a SAMCO number and the provision of harvesting equipment. Workers are told where and when to report and then arrange their own transportation, usually in carpools. Upon hiring, workers are required to produce documentation verifying their legal right to work in the United States. The documentation (birth certificate, greencard, etc.) is photocopied and filed with a signed worker statement attesting to the worker's legal status.

Worker names and numbers are entered into a tally sheet which records each worker's production. SAMCO has a formal piecerate schedule which tabulates the per box piecerate on the basis of tree height, yield, and fruit size, but SAMCO uses this schedule only as a "guide" to the actual piecerate paid for picking an orchard. SAMCO policy is to begin the harvest crew in the easiest part of an orchard and maintain one piecerate for the entire orchard, although the crew does not know what the piecerate actually is until the next day when the foreman announces it. Crews that trust the foreman are more likely to accept the piecerate announced. In the early 1980s, foremen were instructed to establish daily piecerates so that workers earned a target hourly wage ($5.25 in 1982).[13] In the mid-1980s, SAMCO apparently still relies on the traditionally daily foreman-crew negotiation system.

The Ventura citrus industry has traditionally provided fringe benefits not usually offered to most seasonal farmworkers. SAMCO began operations in 1977 with a relatively full complement of benefits, but it began reducing benefits in 1979 and 1980 in the face of lower cost competition from other FLCs (Table 1). For example, free transportation and compensating workers for travel time to distant groves at the minimum wage were offered from 1977 through 1979. Also between 1977 and 1979, wet time and showup time were paid to workers who reported as instructed but were unable to work. Supplemental unemployment benefits were paid to 33 foremen during the lull months until 1980 to augment their unemployment insurance payments so that foremen on layoff received the same take-home pay they earned while working. Health insurance premiums, which were once 100 percent paid by SAMCO, are now split 50-50, and worker participation has dropped dramatically.

However, the average earnings of workers employed by SAMCO have been

13. Although SAMCO does not formally offer a bonus for extra difficult harvesting conditions (the presence of pruning debris or trees on hills), such factors are implicitly taken into account in setting the piecerate to yield a target hourly wage.

Table 1
SAMCO Fringe Benefits

Benefit	Eligibility	Mandatory	SAMCO Costs (1987)	Note
1. Workers Compensation for work-related injuries [a]	All	Yes	21%[b]	2/5 of 45% overhead
2. Unemployment Insurance for full or partial layoff	Paid on wages up to $7000, workers must earn $900 for benefits	Yes	5.3%	
3. Supplemental Unemployment Benefits for foremen	Foremen	No	2 Months Nov-Dec	Dropped in 1982
4. Wet Time and Show-up Time for workers who report as instructed but find it too wet to harvest	Harvesters	No	Minimum wage (no max.)	Dropped in 1980
5. Travel Time for workers transported by SAMCO out of Ventura County	Harvesters	No	Minimum wage	Offered 1977-79 Dropped in 1980
6. Paid Vacations	All workers 1977-1980 Foremen only after 1980	No	$40-$50,000	Dropped for harvesters in 1980
7. Profit Sharing Bonus	Workers on payroll on June 30 who had worked 500 hours in previous year. Foremen only after 1980	No	$30,000	Dropped for harvesters in 1980 ranged from $34.000 - $45.000
8. Retirement/Pension Benefits: Pension	Top 5 forement only	No		Dropped in 1986
9. Health Insurance for families and off-the-job injuries plus dental and vision benefits	After 60 hours and until end of month after layoff	No	1985-$101,5000 1985-$41,000 1986-$23,000	Unit 1984 SAMCO was the only Ventura FLC to pay total premium. In 1985 and 1986 SAMCO paid 50 percent of the premium but less than 10 percent of the employees participated.
10. Work Equipment Gloves, sleeves, helmets	All harvest workers	Yes		SAMCO tightened rules in 1981, e.g., new gloves maximum of every 3 weeks.
11. Supervisor Training	Foremen only	No	$100 per week while attending classes	Continuing safety training for workers compensation
12. Christmas Party	All 150 permanent SAMCO employees	No	$2,000-$3,000	For 200-300 children

[a] Some FLCs allegedly reduce their premiums by not reporting injuries, discouraging workers from reporting injuries or firing injured workers.

[b] Versus 16 to 18 percent in 1985-86

SOURCE: SAMCO records 1987

increasing, reaching $3,500 in 1986 for an average 600 hours worked, or $5.76 hourly. SAMCO's average hourly wages compare favorably with other Ventura citrus harvesters (Limoneira's workers averaged $5.58 in 1985), but SAMCO averages fewer hours of employment, only 471 versus 1056 at Limoneira in 1985.

CONCLUSIONS

Coastal Growers Association (GCA), the most visible employer stabilizing its work force in the early 1970s, raised worker earnings without increasing growers' cost. CGA was unionized in 1978, lost harvesting market share in the 1980s, and was dissolved in 1985. Limoneira is a grower-packer which tried to stabilize its harvest work force by offering employee housing, year-round employment, and an extensive list of fringe benefits. It too experienced unionization for seven years, and is today the highest wage employer in Ventura citrus. SAMCO began as Ventura's only lemon labor contractor in 1977, offering generous fringe benefits. Although SAMCO is still the county's largest lemon harvester, it has had to substantially reduce the benefits it offers.

There are three major lessons to be drawn from these attempts at stabilization:

- First, growers can initially "buy" increased worker earnings and satisfaction at little or no cost as a casual work force is replaced with a relatively stable work force.
- Second, stabilization leads to worker settlement and demands for higher wages and more benefits. The higher costs associated with these settled worker demands are not sustainable if lower cost labor becomes available.
- Third, work force stabilization in Ventura County may have persuaded greencard harvest workers to pick lemons longer, but it did not generate a replacement work force from the U.S.-born and educated children of settled farmworkers. New harvest workers are primarily persons born and raised in Mexico.

The overall conclusion of this study is that work force stabilization cannot convert farm jobs into desirable careers for harvest workers or their families. Instead, stabilization generates tradeoffs for both growers and workers. For growers, the stabilization which initially increases productivity eventually encourages settlement, unionization, and costly demands for higher wages and more benefits, but does not generate a replacement work force. For workers, stabilization made lemon harvesting preferred to other farm jobs, but year-round nonfarm jobs remained the preferred choice of farmworkers with the skills to leave agriculture. For society, the public policy goal of stabilization was undermined by the combination of labor contractors and illegal immigrants, making effective enforcement of labor laws, which could limit such destabilizing influences, very difficult.

The two dynamic elements in the

Ventura labor market since 1975 were unionization and the rise of illegal aliens and FLCs. Without unionization, fragmentation could have come even sooner as growers attempted to reduce their harvesting costs by forcing the associations they created to reduce harvesting costs. Alternatively, it can be argued that unionization increased the variability in harvesting costs, thus helping to open the door for FLCs.

Whether the UFW reduced or increased the variation in labor costs, the illegal alien-FLC resurgence probably would have eventually attracted growers away from high-cost harvesting associations. The associations could not maintain their policies of hiring only legal workers and then satisfying these workers' wage and fringe benefit expectations while FLCs hired illegal alien workers at a much lower cost. The same low-cost type alternative undid SAMCO's attempt at stabilization.

The major conclusion of this report is that it is difficult to sustain improved wages and benefits in seasonal farm work when seasonal farm labor supplies are substantially augmented by large numbers of illegal aliens willing to do seasonal farm work for lower wages and more limited benefits. Stabilization, a popular benefit and a critical element in the shift away from the casual labor market, has largely disappeared from Ventura County citrus harvest work, even though it survives at Limoneira and to a lesser degree at SAMCO.

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Appendix Table A.1

Coastal Growers Association, Fringe Benefit Costs[a]

Benefits	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
1. Medical	$268,901 (5.4)[b]	$227,018 (5.1)	$210,859 (6.6)	$446,558 (10.5)	$483,315 (10.6)	$225,570 (13.4)	$228,610 (6.8)	$165,819 (9.7)	$169,237 (10.1)[g]
2. Holidays & CPD	—	92,338 (2.1)	55,325 (1.7)	95,734 (2.2)	99,687 (2.4)	29,800 (1.8)	51,687 (2.4)	51,394 (3.0)	32,826 (2.0)
3. Paid Vacation	100,267 (2.0)	155,408 (3.5)	93,223 (3.5)	103,055 (2.4)	134,380 (2.9)	36,572 (2.2)	76,429 (1.8)	42,874 (2.5)	39,134 (2.3)
4. Standy, Wet and Travel Time	52,408 (1.0)	114,534 (2.6)	156,809 (4.9)	175,929 (4.1)	156,658 (3.4)	82,988 (4.9)	103,266 (2.4)	41,946 (2.4)	39,917 (2.4)
	$421,577	$589,298	$516,216	$821,276	$876,024	$374,930	$567,992	$302,033	$281,114
Harvester Wages	4,981,156	4,431,919	3,187,858	4,251,689	4,594,260	11,681,562	3,644,717	1,716,283	1,667,755
Total Compensation	$5,402,733	$5,021,217	$3,704,074	$5,072,965	$5,470,284	$2,056,492	$4,212,709	$2,018,316	$1,948,870
Fringe Benefits Percent[f]	7.8%	11.7%	13.9%	16.2%	16.0%	18.2%	13.5%	15.0%	14.4%

[a]CGA fiscal years —eg., November 1, 1976 through October 31, 1977.

[b]Numbers in parentheses are the cost of each fringe benefit as a percentage of harvester wages.

[c]Includes bereavement pay in 1984 and 1985.

[d]Also includes moving time from one local grove to another during the workday.

[e]CGA did not harvest during a four month strike in 1982.

[f]Voluntary or negotiated fringes as a percentage of the listed fringe benefits plus direct picker wages. Foremen and checker wages, mandatory employer-paid programs such as social security, and administative costs are excluded. The UFW represented CGA workers from 1978-1985; negotiated fringes average 14.9 percent of total compensation during these years.

[g]Includes 35 percent for RFK and 65 percent for Pan Am insurance.

Source: Coastal Grower Association Records.

Appendix Table A.2

Coastal Growers Association Employment and Outlook

Year	Pickers Employed	Total Hours Worked	Average Days Worked Per Man	Boxes Picked Per Man	Boxes Picked Per Hour	Total Boxes Picked
1965	8,517	1,286,000	17	629	3.38	4,358,000
1966	6,611	1,833,000	31	1,085	3.91	7,172,000
1967	5,188	1,849,000	40	1,660	4.66	8,615,000
1968	3,870	1,614,000	46	1,961	4.70	7,591,000
1969	3,585	1,342,000	42	1,781	4.76	6,386,000
1970	3,483	1,316,214	47	1,797	4.76	6,261,334
1971	3,757	1,594,431	50	1,889	4.45	7,100,144
1972	3,335	1,559,189	55	2,084	4.46	6,950,225
1973	3,188	1,533,922	57	2,824	5.87	9,001,477
1974	3,057	1,369,717	52	2,617	5.84	8,001,199
1975	3,042	1,595,914	62	3,290	6.27	10,006,373
1976	1,398	1,043,636	88	4,469	5.98	6,247,669
1977	1,602	1,139,735	89	5,036	7.08	8,068,470
1978	1,292	787,638	89	5,150	8.45	6,654,721
1979	897	515,579	82	4,767	8.26	4,272,913
1981	1,215	718,314	84	4,941	8.36	6,003,008
1980	943	650,086	98	5,975	8.67	5,634,575
1982[a]	850	266,971	45	2,403	7.6	2,042,278
1983	832	523,171	90	5,275	8.4	4,388,461
1984	388	260,131	96	5,241	7.60	2,033,430
1985	354	245,935	99	5,730	8.20	2,028,700

[a]There was a four-month strike from March-July 1982.

Source: Coastal Growers Association

Appendix Table A.3

Coastal Grower Association, Wages and Earnings

Year	Average Hourly Farm Wage Rage California	Average Wages Per Hour of Harvest Workers	Average Wages Earned Per Year	District Labor Cost Per Box	Total Cost Per Box	Consumer Price Index
1965	$ 1.34	$ 1.77	$ 267	$ 0.53	$0.53	94.5
1966	1.41	2.02	560	$0.54	0.61	97.2
1967	1.47	2.15	765	0.53	0.58	100.0
1968	1.54	2.23	929	0.54	0.62	104.2
1969	1.63	2.47	925	0.52	0.68	109.8
1970	1.72	2.57	971	0.54	0.73	116.3
1971	1.83	2.57	1,089	0.58	0.74	121.3
1972	1.90	2.72	1,273	0.61	0.78	125.3
1973	2.12	3.02	1,589	0.51	0.72	133.1
1974	2.27	3.27	1,615	0.56	0.84	147.7
1975	2.56	3.61	2,088	0.58	0.86	161.2
1976	2.82	4.00	2,987	0.67	1.10	170.5
1977	2.93	4.34	3,109	0.62	0.98	181.5
1978	3.21	5.63	3,430	0.67	1.09	195.4
1979	3.87	6.16	3,554	0.75	1.22	217.4
1980	4.35	6.54	4,509	0.75	1.27	246.8
1981	—	6.40	3,781	0.77	1.29	272.4
1982	4.69	6.30	1,964	0.83	1.57	289.1
1983	4.55	6.97	4,702	0.83	1.37	298.4
1984	4.85	6.60	4,583	0.86	1.41	311.1
1985	—	6.78	4,710	0.84	1.30	—

Sources: Coastal Growers Associaton; U.S. Department of Agriculture, *FarmLabor*; U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, ***Economic Report of the President***

Appendix Table A.4

Coastal Growers Association, Vacations

Year	Number of Men Earning Vacations	Training Guarantees Paid	Amount Paid Pickers For Vacations
1965	—	$144,459	$———
1966	52	14,581	7,352
1967	108	9,238	16,772
1968	164	4,801	25,180
1969	580	11,670	32,905
1970	590	20,658	36,059
1971	611	26,262	54,929
1972	680	10,846	56,838
1973	738	10,447	59,030
1974	863	9,486	63,210
1975	973	8,446	93,833
1976	842	895	80,268
1977	802	3,712	100,268
1978	888	1,085	93,224
1979	520	302	82,794
1980	647	689	103,055
1981	679	2,020	133,215
1982	—	51	42,361
1983	—	605	75,650
1984	—	458	42,194
1985	—	396	39,134

Source: Coastal Growers Association.

Appendix Table B.1. Limoneira Employment and Wages, 1977-85

	Workers employed[a]	Hours worked	Average hours	Average 7-hour days	Total boxes picked	Boxes per worker	Total earnings	Earnings per worker	Average houly wage	Average boxes/hour
1977	316	279,853	886	127	984,576	3,116	$1,172,202	$3,710	$4.19	3.5
1978	330	240,172	728	104	926,46	2,807	$1,155,840	$3,503	$4.81	3.9
1979	208	179,566	863	123	809,097	3,890	$885,799	$4,259	$4.93	4.5
1980	340	261,452	769	110	1,056,160	3,106	$1,401,817	$4,123	$5.36	4.0
1981	381	298,869	784	112	1,060,037	2,782	$1,580,597	$4,149	$5.29	3.5
1982	387	210,943	545	78	748,761	1,935	$1,198,734	$3,098	$5.68	3.5
1983	373	323,124	866	124	1,207,509	3,237	$1,898,688	$5,090	$5.88	3.7
1984	237	203,052	857	122	694,400	2,930	$1,232,605	$5,201	$6.07	3.4
1985	182	192,216	1056	151	1,048,005	5,758	$1,071,531	$5,888	$5.57	5.5

a/Workers employed in lemons, oranges, and avocados.

	Number of workers earning vacation	Percentage of all workers	Total vacation pay	Vacation pay per worker
1977	150	47%	$43,183	$288
1978	129	39%	$38,303	$297
1979	93	45%	$34,132	$367
1980	137	40%	$52,849	$386
1981	139	36%	$56,189	$404
1982	94	24%	$54,274	$577
1983	168	45%	$67,984	$405
1984	104	44%	$45,153	$434
1985	113	62%	$46,096	$408

Source: Limoneira

Appendix Table C.1. SAMCO Employment and Wages, 1977-1986[a]

Year[b]	Number of workers employed[c]	Total hours worked[d]	Average hours worked	Average 7-hour days worked	Total earnings	Earnings per worker	Average earnings per hour
1977	343				$469,534	$1,369	
1978	758				$1,987,525	$2,622	
1979	1,041				$2,393,155	$2,299	
1980	1,523				$3,978,973	$2,613	
1981	1,974				$4,893,151	$2,479	
1982	1,428				$3,220,266	$2,255	
1983	976	532,561	546	78	$3,350,980	$3,433	$6.29
1984	909	482,776	531	76	$2,869,556	$3,157	$5.94
1985	1,073	505,700	471	67	$3,647,404	$3,399	$7.21
1986	905	541,730	599	86	$3,124,506	$3,452	$5.77

a/Blank cells indicate data are not available.
b Fiscal year ending June 30.
c/Only workers earning $150 or more.
d/Hours worked in lemons (48 % in 1985), oranges (18%), avocados (18%), and prunings (3%).

Source: SAMCO